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Chapter 13 
Interpretation 
Gleider I Hernández 
1. Sketching the Problématique 
Interpretation is a specific epistemological tool within the overall epistemological enterprise 5 
that is scholarship. A form of legal hermeneutics, to study the theory and practice of interpre-
tation is to raise basic jurisprudential questions as to the nature of a legal order, the rules that 
it contains, and the actors vested with authority for the creation – and the interpretation – of 
such rules. For international legal scholarship in particular, these questions are key in identi-
fying with any clarity the processes through which international law develops and evolves. 10 
Responding to such questions is challenging, and it is no surprise that scholars of international 
law approach questions of interpretation with some ‘trepidation’,1 a doubt shared also in do-
mestic legal scholarship.
2
 
The process of interpretation, and the study thereof, is certainly a wider endeavour than can 
be systematised thoroughly in the present chapter alone. Hence, a few points merit mention 15 
from the outset, so as to situate and confine the contribution that I hope will be made here. 
First, the positivist concept of law in a post-modern world, as befits the title of this collection, 
can and does admit of the reality that the interpretative act has a constitutive – or, at the very 
least, a normative – effect on the development of international law: given that legal systems 
are essentially rooted in the power of linguistic constructions, the possibility of semantic inde-20 
terminacy remains a reality. In such contexts, the partially constitutive character of interpreta-
tive acts and practices ought to be uncontroversial, and has been readily conceded by both 
Hans Kelsen and Herbert Hart.
3
 It is in partial reaction to this reality that concepts are put 
forward such as inter-temporal interpretation, the principle of ‘effectiveness’,4 and the princi-
ple of ‘systemic integration’;5 although these can only be touched upon in this chapter, they 25 
seek partially to restore the idea of determinacy within international law, a particularly inde-
terminate system by its very form.
6
 Yet this indeterminacy occurs within the frame of interna-
tional law, a point that will be briefly surveyed in the following section. 
From this vantage point, the next section will proceed within the analytical framework of 
the interpretation of treaties, to challenge some of the presumptions of determinacy contained 30 
in this framework. This is so for two reasons. First, international treaties, as acts through 
which states consciously accept international legal obligations, allow us to consider the bind-
ing character of such obligations and rules whilst avoiding, to a degree, questions relating to 
                                                 
1
 Arnold McNair, The Law of Treaties (2nd edn Clarendon Press 1961) 361.  
2
 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) at 224: ‘[d]espite the basic significance of inter-
pretation for every aspect of the legal enterprise, it has never been a subject with which analytical positivism has 
felt comfortable.’ 
3
 Both Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 2
nd
 edn (M Knight trans.) (University of California Press 1967), ch. 
VIII, and Herbert Hart, The Concept of Law, 2
nd
 edn (OUP, 1994) 144–150, admit of the use of discretion by 
law-applying actors in resolving such indeterminacy. 
4
 As explored carefully in Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in 
the Interpretation of Treaties’ 26 BYBIL (1949) 48–85. 
5
 See Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Conven-
tion’ 54 ICLQ (2005) 279–319. 
6
 David Kennedy situates international law’s structural indeterminacy in that it simultaneously purports to bind 
the subjects who are the source of the law itself: see generally David Kennedy, ‘Theses about International Law 
Discourse’ (1980) 23 GYBIL 353. 
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the different forms of various international legal texts, such as the acts of international organi-
sations or the judgments of international courts or tribunals. Second, the relatively well-
specified rules on treaty interpretation contained in Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT) are frequently argued to be capable of wider abstraction 
to all international legal texts and acts, an assertion that will be challenged in the next section. 5 
Throughout, the analysis will be conducted with an eye on the purpose of interpretation ac-
cording to positivism, that is, ‘to specify the ambit and normative content of the relevant in-
strument’.7 However, my analysis will be cautious as to the purpose of interpretation, bearing 
in mind Sir Humphrey Waldock’s exhortation to the International Law Commission to this 
effect: 10 
[T]he process of interpretation, rightly conceived, cannot be regarded as a mere mechanical one of 
drawing inevitable meanings from the words in a text, or of search for and discovering some pre-
existing specific intention of the parties with respect to every situation arising under a treaty … In 
most cases interpretation involves giving a meaning to a text.
8
 
The discerning of meaning is claimed to be the central purpose of the interpretative pro-15 
cess; yet I submit that in fact, the interpretive process also involves a process of constructing 
meaning. The very character of interpretation cannot simply be assumed to have an objective 
character, given the difficulties raised by the so-called ‘hermeneutic circle’, or the claim that 
the meaning of a text as a whole can only be established by reference to its individual parts, 
and that one’s understanding of each individual part is constructed only by reference the 20 
whole.
9
 This view holds that there is no neutral, external standpoint from which to measure 
objectively the meaning of a system of signs or actions; there is thus a need to remove what is 
arbitrary or extrinsic from the circle, and focus exclusively on the object of cognition.
10
 The 
narrative of classical positivist theorising on interpretation (to the extent that there is such 
theorising) presumes the objectivity of the interpretative process, a process that aims purely to 25 
clarify, developing a method to fill any ambiguities in the fabric of the legal system with the 
one correct response, based on reason.
11
 So confined, the interpretative process can appear to 
be self-confirming, an unhappy conclusion if one considers that social constructions ought to 
have rational justification and empirical support. Accordingly, the last section of this chapter 
will consider some subjectivist theories of interpretation that have been presented, respective-30 
ly, by leading figures in the New Haven School and the Critical Legal Studies movements. 
2. Semantic Indeterminacy and the ‘Frame’ of a Legal System 
2.1 A Legal System as a ‘Frame’ for Interpretation 
Kelsen’s ‘theory of legal science’, as a project of cognising the law through the methods of 
striving for truth,
12
 did contain certain categorical assertions relating to the nature of the inter-35 
                                                 
7
 Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law (OUP 2008) 285. 
He continues: interpretation ‘is also denoted as the exercise that clarifies the sense of the treaty … and its effect; 
or ascertains the intention of the parties from the text, their common intention’. 
8
 Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, ‘Document A/CN.4/167 and Add.1–3: Third Report on the Law 
of Treaties’ Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II (1964) 53 (para. 1), citing ‘Codification of 
International Law: Part III – Law of Treaties’ 29 AJIL Supplement (1935) 653–1228 at 939 (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
9
 See generally Martin Heidegger, On Being and Time (1927). 
10
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (Continuum Publishing Group 1975, 1989 reissue), especially at 
266-67. 
11
 Kelsen, note 3 at 351. 
12
 For further discussion, see Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘Hans Kelsen in Post-Modern International Legal Scholarship’, 
in this volume at 3. 
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pretative process. Chief amongst classical positivist claims is that participants in legal cogni-
tion, be they scholars, judges or practitioners, ought to be limited purely to cognising positive 
acts of law and measuring them according to their positive validity.
13
 Yet to do so in interna-
tional law is to conflate positivism with voluntarism;
14
 and Kelsen and other ‘Modern’ critics 
of classical legal positivism were sufficiently responsive to difficulties with indeterminacy in 5 
legal texts. Kelsen readily conceded the ‘intentional indefiniteness’ of certain law-applying 
acts and even the unintended indefiniteness inherent in the linguistic formulation of legal 
norms.
15
 His vision of the legal system was that it formed a ‘frame’ that admitted of possible 
applications of norms in concrete cases
16
 the act of individual application helped further to 
determine and constitute a general legal rule.
17
 Kelsen’s critique of classical legal positivism 10 
questioned the idea that the act of application was nothing but an act of understanding and 
clarification: he situated it as an act of will or cognition: a choice.
18
 This characterisation ren-
ders untenable any categorical distinction, within a given frame, between law-creation and 
law-application by law-applying actors: to him, these were also law-making acts.
19
 His solu-
tion was to admit of the constitutive nature of discretion, in the application of such rules, by 15 
law-applying authorities in a legal system. Similarly, Hart conceded a certain place for discre-
tion in a legal system whose rules were sufficiently determinate to supply standards of correct 
judicial decision,
20
 although he also foresaw that hard cases helped to prove a fundamental 
‘incompleteness’ in law, where the law could provide no answer.21 This is in part because 
Hart’s theory was essentially reductionist22 in so far as it tried to confine itself to describing 20 
how law and a legal system could arrive at the validity of rules, and not on the determinacy of 
the legal order itself. 
It is well-known that Ronald Dworkin rejected the idea that the law could be incomplete 
and contain gaps, choosing instead a view that law is not incomplete and indeterminate, being 
supplemented by principles, principles that can themselves be derived from moral justifica-25 
tions if necessary.
23
 This would have been inadmissible to Kelsen: 
It is, from a scientific and hence objective point of view, inadmissible to proclaim as solely correct an 
interpretation that from a subjectively political viewpoint is more desirable than another, logically 
equally possible, interpretation. For in that case, a purely political value judgment is falsely presented 
as scientific truth.
24
 30 
In any event, what is interesting about Dworkin is that the discretion exercised in the inter-
pretative act requires the construction and balancing of the principles underlying legal rules, a 
‘weak’ form of discretion exercised within the ‘open texture’25 of a legal system. Legal inter-
                                                 
13
 Kammerhofer, note 12 at 3. 
14
 Kammerhofer note 12 at 7; Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Herbert Hart in Post-Modern International Legal Scholarship’ 
in this volume, at 22, suggests that reductionism is indifferent as to the material source of the law, concerning 
itself only with its formal validity. 
15
 Kelsen, note 3 at 350. 
16
 Kelsen, note 3 at 351. 
17
 Kelsen, note 3 at 349. 
18
 Kelsen, note 3 at 82-3. 
19
 Kelsen, note 3 at 85. See also I Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change 
and Normative Twists (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 31. 
20
 Hart, note 3 at 145. Hart’s reliance on specifically judicial discretion was premised on his view that judges are 
law-applying officials within a given legal system; and thus specifically entrusted with safeguarding that system. 
21
 Hart, note 3 at 252 (in his ‘Postscript’ to The Concept of Law). 
22
 D’Aspremont’s term: note 14 at 2, passim. 
23
 Cf Hart, note 3 at 204-5, denying the legality of recourse to moral justification. 
24
 Kelsen, note 3 at 356.  
25
 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1978), at 31-2. He distinguished his form of 
‘weak’ discretion from the ‘strong’ discretion that he purported Kelsen and Hart attributed to judges, which 
allowed them to reach for principles outside a legal system. Dworkin’s point is fair. If one examines Kelsen, note 
3 at 352, his refusal to privilege any acceptable meaning within the frame is evident: ‘[f]rom the point of view of 
Gleider I Hernández 4 
pretation would then become an act of cognising the possibilities available within the frame of 
the system;
26
 in this respect at least, it is reconcilable with Kelsen and Hart, in that it also situ-
ates the interpretative process within the frame of a legal system. With respect to international 
law, such limits are part of its inner logic, and its inherent structural biases that are deeply 
embedded within the international legal system itself.
27
 5 
2.2 Limits to indeterminacy 
Although the indeterminacy of legal language is in many respects presumed, it does not allow 
for unlimited choices in how interpretation shapes and constructs the meaning of a text. With-
in that indeterminacy comes a measure of determinacy; the ‘canonical terms’ within a legal 
text provide a limit to the political choices available to the interpreter. He or she cannot arrive 10 
at interpretations that clearly offend the actual words used, or that are justified by policies and 
principles wholly absent from the canonical terms.
28
 Certainly the text is the ‘first authorita-
tive reference point’29 through which the interpretation of a norm is constructed; but the text 
is not reducible to a fixed, immutable expression of the rule. What is more, the engagement of 
actors with a legal text is historically contingent: it is structured by the frame in which it is 15 
situated, and measured against rules contained within that frame, not to mention past practices 
of other actors or disputants.
30
 
Therefore, the outer limits that mark the field of possible interpretations may be recog-
nised in an act of scientific legal cognition by capable legal scholars;
31
 but true to the Kantian 
inspiration of Kelsen’s legal theory, the concrete meaning of a norm in the individually dis-20 
puted case cannot be discovered but only created. This is broadly consonant with Hart’s so-
cial thesis, where the claim to authority of an interpretative act is to adhere to the standards of 
legal argument and interpretation that are accepted by officials within that system.
32
 Under-
stood thus, interpretation is a relatively open exercise taking place within a confined setting, a 
setting defined by the four corners of the text itself.
33
 Even in classical legal positivism there 25 
is a certain openness based in the language used in constructing a text: ‘[b]y virtue of linguis-
tic openness, legal positivism in its purest form is never immune to such changes in meaning 
and to the consequent informal development of law’.34 As such, the theoretical possibilities of 
reasonable meaning – and thus, the contestability of meaning – are limited by these practical 
limits, which would confirm the binding force of international law.
35
 30 
3. The ‘Sources of Sources’ and the Rules of Interpretation 
3.1 Articles 31–33 VCLT as Abstract Rules of Interpretation? 
                                                                                                                                                        
positive law, one method is exactly as good as the other’. Similarly Hart, note 3 at 204–205, admits that the in-
terpretation of legal texts and precedents by judges leaves open a ‘vast field’ for judicial law-creation, yet gives 
few indicia as to what standards should guide judges should the legal rules in question be ambiguous.  
26
 Kelsen, note 3 at 351.  
27
 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument (Finnish Law-
yers’ Publishing Company 1989, reissued CUP 2005), at 568. 
28
 Venzke, note 19 at 5. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Venzke, note 19 at 49. 
31
 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (Clarendon Press, 1991), 44. 
32
 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart 1986) at 67. 
33
 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, note 25 at 108-109. 
34
 Ulrich Fastenrath, ‘Relative Normativity in International Law’ 4 EJIL (2003) 315, at 316. 
35
 Venzke, note 19 at 49. 
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The natural tendency of the international lawyer is to seek comfort in certainty,
36
 and to seek 
authoritative rules that lend order to what otherwise could be excessively subjective: an ex-
press ‘basic assumption that [a] legal regime can only be described in terms of a more or less 
coherent system of rules’.37 However valid the criticism that the rules of interpretation are 
‘not the determining cause of judicial decisions, but the form in which the judge cloaks a re-5 
sult arrived at by other means’,38 Articles 31–33 VCLT carry with them that allure, with one 
view suggesting their transcendent nature as abstract rules of interpretation, extending beyond 
the remit of treaties.
39
 That these articles settle the scope of the interpretative process is often 
taken as a matter of faith in establishing the ‘objective’ character of interpretation as a means 
to attaining legal certainty: 10 
[T]he rules of interpretation laid down in international law contain a description of the way an applier 
shall be proceeding to determine the correct meaning of a treaty provision considered from the point of 
view of international law.
40
 
The appeal of recourse to Articles 31–33 VCLT goes further than mere coherence, especially 
given their now-accepted customary status in international law.
41
 Classical legal positivism 15 
argues that treaty interpretation represents the interpretation of an act essentially posited by 
states, and thus a source of obligation as much as a source of law. 
A modern example of this position is Alexander Orakhelashvili, who suggests categorically 
that ‘[t]he Vienna Convention methods of interpretation, as the practice consistently demon-
strates, are not only treaty-based methods but also constitute the generally accepted legal 20 
framework of constitutional significance’.42 To him, therefore, interpretation as a cognitive 
process has been supplanted by the treaty-based Vienna Convention methods that have been 
posited. He continues: 
[T]he view that the rules of the Vienna Convention are merely working assumptions is misguided, 
being a mere assertion unsupported by any evidence. The text of the Vienna Convention, the process 25 
of its drafting and the practice of its application are all unanimous in affirming that the rules of treaty 
                                                 
36
 As was recalled by Special Rapporteur Ago during the first reading of the Draft Articles on the Law of Trea-
ties, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. I (1964) 23, para 34. 
37
 Ulf Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Springer 2007) 19. 
38
 H Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation’, note 4 at 53. 
39
 Orakhelashvili, note 7 at 294, again suggesting that the Vienna Convention has posited rules that supersede 
thethe objective and subjective approaches to interpretation delineated in Koskenniemi, note 27 at . See also 
Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Unilateral Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions: UK Practice’ 2 Göttingen 
Journal of International Law (2010) 823–842 at 824, arguing for the applicability of the rules of treaty interpre-
tation to resolutions passed by the Security Council. 
40
 Linderfalk, note 37 at 29. 
41
 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (‘IJzeren Rijn’) Railway (Bel-
gium/Netherlands), Award of 24 May 2005 at 23 (para. 45): ‘it is now well established that the provisions on 
interpretation of treaties contained in Arts 31 and 32 of the Convention reflect pre-existing customary interna-
tional law. 
The Court even applies the VCLT between states not parties to it: see e.g. France in Certain Questions of Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment of 4 June 2008, ICJ Reports (2008) 177; Indone-
sia in Sovereignty over Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment of 17 December 2002, 
ICJ Reports (2002) 625 at 645–646 (para. 37); and Botswana and Namibia in Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu 
Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999, ICJ Reports (1999) 1045 at 1059 (para. 18). 
Orakhelashvili, note 7 at 313–315, cites substantial arbitral practice and a number of WTO Appellate Body deci-
sions which take the same position. 
42
 Orakhelashvili, note 7 at 317. But cf. criticism of this point by Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘Book Review: Alexander 
Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law’ 20 EJIL (2009) 1282–1286 at 
1283–1284; and M Waibel, ‘Demystifying the Art of Interpretation (Review Essay) (2011) 22 EJIL 571 at 583-
584. 
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interpretation are fixed rules and do not permit the interpreter a free choice among interpretative 
methods.
43
 
Similarly, Linderfalk claims that, with the entry into force of Articles 31–33 VCLT, many 
of the major controversies relating to interpretation writ large ‘must be considered as finally 
resolved’.44 His justification is practical, not doctrinal: 5 
Not only will such investigations contribute to reducing disagreement among appliers with regard to 
the contents of international law. They will also provide the foundation for a constructive and more 
rational discussion concerning how the freedom of action left to the appliers under international law 
should be used.
45
 
For all this, it seems to the present author that the rules on treaty interpretation of the VCLT 10 
do not lend themselves automatically, nor easily, to abstraction. First, the idea that posited 
rules of interpretation supersede the nature of the interpretative process as a cognitive faculty 
goes a step too far, reducing the nature of the international legal system to an unreflexive 
dogmatism. To adopt the VCLT’s approach uncritically (which even the International Court 
of Justice itself was rather hesitant to do for some time, even when it was relying on the arti-15 
cles sub silentio), would even do violence to the Commission’s own modesty when drafting 
what became Articles 31–33: 
[T]he question raised by jurists is rather as to the non-obligatory character of many of these principles 
and maxims. They are, for the most part, principles of logic and good sense valuable as guides to assist 
in appreciating the meaning which the parties may have intended … recourse to many of these princi-20 
ples is discretionary rather than obligatory …46 
Even within a purely voluntarist concept of international law, the VCLT itself is nothing 
more than a multilateral treaty, and was not conceived as being hierarchically superior to oth-
er forms of treaties. Even if its substantive provisions on the rules of interpretation and other 
matters (pacta sunt servanda, rebus sic stantibus) are regarded as codifications of customary 25 
international law, they were never intended to be the ‘source-law’ for all treaties to which 
they apply.
47
 As such, although they are a useful heuristic device through which to filter the 
debates within international legal scholarship, they cannot substitute for the reality of inter-
pretation as both a cognitive and law-creative process. 
In any event, the Vienna Convention rules are very much specific to the particular form of a 30 
treaty within international law. Certainly, there may be some principles that can be distilled 
from the VCLT rules  that may be relevant for other legal texts in so far as they are paralleled 
by treaties, but only in so far as the intention behind such legal texts is similar.
48
 
A particularly good illustration is to be found in the case law of the ICJ when interpreting 
resolutions of the Security Council, which are themselves written instruments, concluded by 35 
                                                 
43
 Orakhelashvili, note 7 at 309. Relying on the International Law Commission, ‘Commentaries to the Draft 
Articles: Law of Treaties’ Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. II (1966) at 219–220, Orakhe-
lashvili concludes at 310 that ‘the Vienna Convention conclusively and definitively replaced the relevance of 
various “schools” of interpretation by formulating a single regime of interpretation based on rules’. But what this 
suggests is that the Vienna Convention proposed a single, coherent, general approach (Orakhelashvili calls it 
‘holistic’) and that the approach was designed to be totalising, to impose a standard of interpretation of all acts in 
all circumstance 
44
 Linderfalk, note 37 at 3, although he tempers this with the discussion of radical legal scepticism versus the 
‘one-right-answer’ thesis. 
45
 Linderfalk, note 37 at 6. 
46
 International Law Commission, note 43 at 218–219 (paras 4–5), also cited in Ian Brownlie, Principles of Pub-
lic International Law (6th edn OUP 2003) 602; Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (OUP 2007) 37. 
Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, ‘Document A/CN.4/186 and Add.1–7: Sixth Report on the Law of 
Treaties’ Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. II (1966) at 94 (para. 1). 
47
 Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘Systemic Integration, Legal Theory and the ILC’ Finnish Yearbook of International Law 
13 (2008) 343–366 at 354–355. 
48
 Lauterpacht, note 4 at 78. 
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representatives of states, and capable of generating legal obligations. Faced with the oppor-
tunity to rely on the VCLT rules when interpreting Security Council resolution 1244 in the 
Kosovo advisory opinion of 2010, the Court drafted a cryptic paragraph concluding that the 
rules contained in the VCLT ‘could provide guidance’ for the interpretation of Security 
Council resolutions, but that other factors were to be taken into account.
49
 Accordingly, it 5 
behoves the interpreter to consider the nature and form of a legal text, and recall Waldock’s 
distinction between principles (‘guides to assist in appreciating the meaning’)50 and methods 
(textual, subjective, and teleological)
51
 of interpretation: that distinction outlines the descrip-
tive, and not consciously prescriptive, spirit which has always permeated the VCLT’s ap-
proach.
52
 10 
Even if the VCLT approach to treaty interpretation cannot be taken as gospel, the treaty has 
been the quintessential legal instrument upon which most scholarly theorising on interpreta-
tion has been aimed, and in order to engage with classical positivist theories of international 
legal interpretation on their own terms, the rules on treaty interpretation constitute a self-
contained, complete analytical frame that has attempted to systematise and to structure the 15 
various possible methods for discerning the meaning of a legal text. As a frame, they are wor-
thy of careful examination. 
3.2 The ‘Crucible’ Approach of the VCLT 
At its core, the object of treaty interpretation is ‘[t]o determine the meaning of a treaty provi-
sion’.53 The act of interpretation, in this respect, suggests that meaning is not self-evident, or 20 
else the converse, that meaning needs to be determined, because several possibilities are left 
open by the legal order. As Kelsen has suggested, the system of norms in question thus leaves 
open a degree of choice: it ‘leaves this decision to an act of norm creation to be performed’.54 
It also entails a condition of ambiguity: ‘[i]t is not possible to interpret what has no need of 
interpretation’.55 Yet perhaps this condition of ambiguity for the interpretative act is overstat-25 
ed: in order to discern whether ambiguity or lack of clarity exists, one must first interpret the 
relevant text, using the means of interpretation laid out in Articles 31–33 VCLT. In keeping 
with this point, one must turn to the Commission’s view that Article 31, as a whole, sets out a 
single ‘general rule of interpretation’ consisting of four distinct, non-hierarchical modes of 
interpretation, all of which are technically primary rules of interpretation.
56
 This is known as 30 
the ILC’s ‘crucible’ metaphor: ‘all the various elements, as they were present in any given 
                                                 
49
 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Re-
quest for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, no ICJ Report yet, 404 at 442 (para. 94). This 
has been the Court’s position for some time: see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion of 21 June 1971, ICJ Reports (1971) 16 at 53 (para. 114). 
50
 Waldock, note 8 at at 54 (para. 6). 
51
 Waldock, note 8 at 54 (para. 7). 
52
 Waldock, note 8 at 54 (para. 8): the Commission’s aspiration was to ‘seek to isolate and to codify the compar-
atively few rules which appear to constitute the strictly legal basis of the interpretation of treaties’. See also Gar-
diner, note 46 at 27: ‘the Vienna rules …[combine] a clear indication of what should be taken into account with 
some rather less prescriptive pointers as to how to use the indicated material, and in the final analysis leaving a 
margin of appreciation for the interpreter to produce an outcome.’ 
53
 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 
3 March 1950, ICJ Reports (1948) 57 at 61. 
54
 Kelsen, note 3 at 352. 
55
 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations (Charles G Fenwick (tr.) Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916, re-
print 1964) at 263, cited in Lauterpacht, note 4 at 48. 
56
 Gardiner, note 46 at 8. 
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case, would be thrown into the crucible,
57
 and their interaction would give the legally relevant 
interpretation.’58 
The ‘crucible’ metaphor is apposite in describing the array of approaches embodied in Ar-
ticle 31(1), which encompass good faith, ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty, in their 
context, and in the light of the treaty’s object and purpose. Already here, one begins to see 5 
contradictions and limitations in the terms of Article 31 itself in respect of elucidating the 
purpose of interpretation. The ‘ordinary meaning’ term used therein presupposes the possibil-
ity of natural logic, or an objectivity of meaning in the text itself;
59
 yet equally, and without 
hierarchy between the approaches, one must also interpret the terms of the treaty ‘in their 
context and in the light of [the treaty’s] object and purpose’.60 Accordingly, it is not unrea-10 
sonable to arrive at the peculiar conclusion that the ordinary meaning of a text can only be 
determined through its context
61
 and with regard to the treaty’s object and purpose, a conclu-
sion that, if well-founded, seems to dismiss outright the possibility of textual interpretation 
being conducted purely through reference to the immediate terms of a treaty, as ‘it ultimately 
cannot help to see but many other words which again need interpretation’.62 15 
To add to this complexity, Article 31(3) VCLT is relevant when we consider subsequent 
agreements, subsequent practice, and ‘other relevant rules of international law’,63 all of which 
are added to the crucible as simultaneous primary sources for interpretation.
64
 As such, treaty 
interpretation cannot be seen as a quest merely to distil the original meaning of a statement or 
text, based on taking its words at their face value at the time they were drafted.
65
 This cannot 20 
be so given the immediate link which Article 31 makes with context and with the requirement 
of consideration of the object and purpose of a treaty, even before further elements of the gen-
eral rule, including subsequent practice and other ‘relevant rules’ of general international law, 
are taken into account.
66
 
                                                 
57
 The ‘crucible’ approach also avoids hierarchy of application and in some respects reflects the reality that no 
one formal maxim objectively dominates the process of interpretation by a judicial institution: see Charles Fair-
man, ‘The Interpretation of Treaties’ 20 Transactions of the Grotius Society (1935) 123–139 at 134–135. 
58
 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties: Official Records: Documents of the Conference, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.3/11/Add.2 at 39 (para. 8) and International Law Commission, note 43 at 219–220 (para. 8). See also 
Santiago Torres Bernárdez, ‘Interpretation of Treaties by the International Court of Justice following the Adop-
tion of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ in Gerhard Hafner et al. (eds), Liber Amicorum 
Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern (Kluwer Law International 1998) at 726 (para. 11): ‘…one of the most 
distinctive features of the Vienna Convention system … [is] that interpretation of a treaty, or a provision of a 
treaty, is a legal operation which should combine the various permitted elements and means of interpretation as 
they may be present in the case, while keeping open the interpretation until the very conclusion of the interpreta-
tive process’ (emphasis added). 
59
 As Venzke, note 19 at 50, puts it, ‘the word is in the beginning of interpretation.’ 
60
 Art. 31(1) VCLT. 
61
 Art. 31(2) VCLT, in fact defines ‘context’ broadly. ‘Context’ in interpretation may be found both internally, 
within the treaty and its terms, preamble and annexes, and externally, as comprising agreements or instruments 
‘relating’ to the treaty. 
62
 See, generally, Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Norma-
tive Twists (Oxford University Press 2012), 3. 
63
 For further discussion on the effects of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT as a principle of ‘systemic integration’ see 
generally, McLachlan, note 5 especially at 280–282; and Duncan French, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the Incorpo-
ration of Extraneous Legal Rules’ 55 ICLQ (2006) 281–314. 
64
 It should be noted that subsequent practice is not conceptualised as a modification to a treaty: see McNair, note 
1at 424; and as the Permanent Court of International Justice concluded in Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty 
of Lausanne (Frontier between Turkey and Iraq), Advisory Opinion of 21 November 1925, PCIJ Series B No. 12 
(1925) 24. 
65
 As some would claim: see Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective 
(Routledge 2011) 127–128, maintaining that a text is static: ‘international treaty law is the text which remains; 
therefore, its meanings remain. The correct temporal reference point is ex tunc; anything else constitutes a 
change.’ 
66
 Gardiner, note 46 at 26. 
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Even so, if the ‘crucible’ approach to the process of interpretation is essentially simultane-
ous, this exhortation cannot be taken too literally, as pragmatism dictates that elements are 
only taken up one at a time.
67
 Accordingly, the various elements are cumulative, and must be 
evaluated as a whole.
68
 As such, the process of interpretation may require elements to be con-
sidered more than once, as the different priorities enumerated in Article 31 in turn arise.
69
 It is 5 
not for naught that critics of the ‘crucible’ approach have taken to task the immense com-
plexity of this process, suggesting that Articles 31 and 32 VCLT are so contradictory to the 
point of being meaningless,
70
 leaving more questions open than settled.
71
 Moreover, whether 
ironic, or merely symptomatic
72
 of the inherent difficulties in the Convention’s provisions on 
interpretation, there exists considerable disagreement on the ‘interpretation of the rules of 10 
interpretation’, all of which seek to establish objectively the intention of the authors of a legal 
text. It is to these various approaches that the next section turns. 
4. The Traditional Theories on ‘Objective’ Interpretation 
4.1 The Notion of ‘Plain Meaning’ and the Faith in Textualism 
Even though neither Article 31 nor Article 32 VCLT actually employ the term ‘intention’ in 15 
elucidating the rules of interpretation,
73
 amongst classical positivist international lawyers at 
least, ‘no one seriously denies that the aim of treaty interpretation is to give effect to the inten-
tions of the parties’.74 That faith that the text itself holds the key to identifying party intention 
is repeated to the present day.
75
 
                                                 
67
 As the ICJ has done since its early days: see Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State 
to the United Nations, note 53 at 8: ‘the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply provi-
sions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in 
which they occur.’ The ordinary meaning of the text thus takes precedence over the object and purpose of a trea-
ty and other available means of interpretation. 
68
 As the International Law Commission noted in its ‘Commentaries to the Draft Articles: Law of Treaties’, note 
43 at 220 See also Waldock’s comments in the Commission’s debates: Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, 
‘Document A/CN.4/183 and Add.1–4: Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission Vol. II (1966) at 36 and Waldock, note 43 at 206. See also the intervention by Yasseen, suggesting 
that the Commission’s proposal prescribed ‘a general method for achieving that purpose … The means enumer-
ated were … arranged, not in any order of precedence, but in a practical order, which was self-evident in view of 
the circumstances’ 871st Meeting of the Commission, 16 June 1966, Yearbook of the International Law Com-
mission Vol. I (1966) at 197 (para. 48). 
69
 Gardiner, note 46 at 30. 
70
 Koskenniemi, note 39 at 334 (fn. 89), wryly noted that Article 31 refers to ‘virtually all thinkable interpretative 
methods’, blending textualism with intentionalism, context and object and purpose. 
71
 As Philip Allott suggests in The Health of Nations (CUP 2002) 305, the VCLT ‘merely reduced these disa-
greements to writing’. 
72
 As observed by Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Review of Richard Gardiner’s “Treaty Interpretation” and Ulf 
Linderfalk’s “On the Interpretation of Treaties”’ 53 German Yearbook of International Law (2009) 721–724 at 
722. 
73
 Yet see Orakhelashvili, note 7 at 312 (fn. 47): the term ‘intention’ is used some fifteen times throughout the 
VCLT. 
74
 This would be the ‘juridically natural view’: see Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation’ 28 BYBIL (1951) 1–28 at 3–4; and Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law 
and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–1954: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’ 
33 BYBIL (1957) 203–293 at 204. See also Lauterpacht, note 4 at 52, 55, 75–76. But cf. Kammerhofer, note 65 
at 89, who emphasises the cognitive aspects of the process: ‘[t]he will of the parties is on this view not only a 
logical moment. The will has content; therefore, that juncture of wills is an intent or intention. … Assuming all 
that, should not our cognition then aim for the ‘true’ treaty, i.e. party intent?’ 
75
 Orakhelashvili, note 7 at 286; Gardiner, note 46 at 87; Jean-Marc Sorel and Valérie Boré-Eveno, ‘Article 31’ 
in O Corten and P Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 804, 
at 806. 
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Yet even in the VCLT itself, there are a number of means by which the intention of the par-
ties can be re-constructed. Chief amongst these methods is to uphold the ordinary meaning of 
the words of a text above all other means of interpretation, what will be termed here a textual-
ist approach. It is characterised by two presumptions: first, the Vattelian faith that clear writ-
ten language renders nugatory the need for interpretation or for an interpreter,
76
 or at least 5 
minimises his role (into an applier); and second, a distrust of extra-textualism as encouraging 
the ‘arbitrary introduction of unreliable and biased considerations in the guise of interpreta-
tion’.77 According to the textualist position, whatever the psychological or internalised inten-
tions of the parties, once these have intermingled and balanced, to then be abstracted into a 
written text, ‘only its terms are agreed upon and only its terms the parties promise to abide by. 10 
The treaty text is specifically designed to express the intentions of the parties’.78 Adherence to 
textualism thus creates a rebuttable presumption that the text, which is the outcome of the 
meeting of the minds, is presumed to embody the intentions of the drafters, which the Interna-
tional Law Commission’s own Commentary to the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties 
would seem to confirm: 15 
[T]he text must be presumed to be an authentic expression of the intention of the parties; … in conse-
quence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investi-
gation ab initio into the intention of the parties.
79
 
But the textualist approach goes further than merely suggesting that the text is a starting 
point: its principal claim is that if the text is clear, recourse to extra-textual means of interpre-20 
tation should not be necessary.
80
 The claim that ‘declared will’ takes priority over internal 
volition
81
 is both methodological and conceptual,
82
 and is underpinned by a faith in the de-
terminacy of legal language: by reducing, confining, and otherwise minimising the third-party 
interpreter’s grounds for discretion,83 his function is simply to illuminate the intention of the 
parties as expressed in the language of an agreement. Following the formula exactly is intend-25 
ed to yield the same, predictable result: it is a process of cognition. The over-abundance of 
caution inherent in legal drafting also belies a sense of complacency, as parties tend to lift, 
uncritically, text from other treaties and from judgments. This repetitive incantation of text 
‘that already works’ has doubtless led to the recondite form that many contemporary treaties 
now take. 30 
4.2 Beyond the Text: Constructing, Objectively, the Intention of the Parties 
                                                 
76
 Myres S McDougal, Harold D Lasswell, James C Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public 
Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (Yale University Press 1967) suggest that the position taken by the 
Commission in the Draft Articles ‘comes perilously close to Vattel’s assumption that there are plain and natural 
meanings that do not admit of interpretation’ (at 90). 
77
 Richard A Falk, ‘On Treaty Interpretation and the New Haven Approach: Achievements and Prospects’ 8 
Virginia Journal of International Law (1967–1968) 323–355 at 333. 
78
 Kammerhofer, note 65 at 89, reporting the position. 
79
 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, note 58 at 40 (para. 11) and International Law Commis-
sion, note 43 at 220 (para. 11). 
80
 For a concrete example of a textualist argument, see Frank Berman, ‘Treaty “Interpretation” in a Judicial Con-
text’ 29 Yale Journal of International Law (2004) 315–322 at 320–321. 
81
 See Charles de Visscher, Théories et réalités du droit international public (3rd edn Pedone 1963) 17 and 
Fitzmaurice (1951), note 74 at 3; Fitzmaurice (1957), note 74 at 205–206. 
82
 Falk, note 77 at 324: ‘there is disclosed the wavering between the autonomy and objectivity of the interpreta-
tive process, on the one side, and its normative, instrumental function on the other. This wavering, and the ob-
scurity of meaning that results from it, makes interpretation at once fascinating and mysterious as an object of 
inquiry.’ 
83
 A view similar to that expressed by Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A 
Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules (OUP 2011) 157. 
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The faith in the determinacy of legal language also leads to extravagant claims; according to 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the textualist approach presumes to have found ‘where those inten-
tions are to be found, [and] where they are (primarily) to be looked for’.84 It is myopic: the 
supposed simplicity and hermetic nature of ‘plain’ meaning does not exclude questionable or 
‘illusory’ elements; in fact, the question whether a particular sense of ‘plain’ obtains is at ‘the 5 
very heart of the task of interpretation’.85 It also bears recalling that according to Article 31, 
‘plain’ or ordinary meaning is always read in the context of the treaty and its object and pur-
pose. As such, the ‘canon’ upholding ‘the context’ not only complements or confirms the 
plain meaning, but can also correct the erroneous versions of it. Otherwise, context is irrele-
vant in the face of ‘plain’ meaning.86 There is also confusion as to whether ‘ordinary mean-10 
ing’ is a purely linguistic term; or whether it refers to the possibility of ordinary meaning in 
international law, an issue which raises wider questions beyond the scope of this chapter. In 
this respect, any canon of ‘ordinary meaning’ arguably withstands closer scrutiny if redefined 
as ‘the ordinary meaning in the context’.87  
Ultimately, the claim by textualism, that it is the one true method through which the inten-15 
tion of the parties can be divined,
88
 ‘puts the cart before the horse’.89 As McDougal, Laswell, 
and Miller have claimed, ‘[r]eliance on declared instead of actual intent is non-consensual: its 
point is not to give effect to real will but to the legitimate expectations of other States. It is a 
standard of justice’.90 Pure textualism, in this respect, falls short; and it is for this reason that 
the VCLT includes such a range of methods, both in its primary means of interpretation and 20 
in the supplementary means of interpretation contained in Article 32. Before turning to the 
other means of interpretation embodied in Article 31, a brief segue into the relationship be-
tween Article 31 (primary means of interpretation) and Article 32 (supplementary means of 
interpretation) is relevant here, as recourse to preparatory work reflects most clearly the pur-
pose of interpretation in attempting to construct the meaning of a treaty text. 25 
4.3 Preparatory Work as a Supplementary Means of Interpretation 
A proxy for the debate on intentionalism versus textualism is embodied in the ‘supplemen-
tary’ means of interpretation referred to in Article 32 VCLT. The interpretative elements of 
each paragraph of Article 31 are to be employed in determining the meaning of any treaty, 
while recourse to the sources and materials available under Article 32 is never obligatory, and 30 
                                                 
84
 Fitzmaurice (1951), note 74 at 90. 
85
 Julius Stone, ‘Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation: A Study in the International Judicial Process’ 1 
Sydney Law Review (1954) 344–368 at 355. At 356 he continues: ‘the “plain” … or “ordinary” … meaning has 
no other claim to primacy other than that … words are ordinarily used in the sense in which they are ordinarily 
used – … the generally used standard of meaning is the standard of meaning generally used’ (emphasis re-
moved). This circularity also has a strongly objective element: if the intention of the parties cannot be discerned, 
the ‘plain’ meaning given to terms seems to be that general or ‘ordinary’ meaning that non-parties, or in fact the 
third-party interpreter, would affix to the text. 
86
 Stone, note 85 at 357. 
87
 See Interpretation of Convention of 1919 concerning Employment of Women during the Night, Advisory Opin-
ion of 15 November 1932, PCIJ Series A/B No. 50 (1932) 365 at 383 (Diss. Op. Judge Anzilotti). 
88
 Fitzmaurice (1957), note 74 at 205; Ian M Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn 
Manchester University Press 1984) 115, 141. As claims McNair, note 74 at 365–366, the entirety of the maxims 
and canons of interpretation ‘which have crystallised out … are merely prima facie guides to the intentions of 
the parties.’ Or as Orakhelashvili, note 7 at 286 would simplify it, ‘[a]ll international acts embody State consent 
and agreement, expressed in one or another form. Therefore, interpretation methods must be those which deduce 
the meaning exactly of what has been consented to and agreed’. 
89
 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Doctrine of Plain Meaning’ in Elihu Lauterpacht (ed.), International Law: Being the 
Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, Vol. 4 (CUP 1978) 393–403 at 396. 
90
 Koskenniemi, note 39 at 343. 
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may be used generally only to confirm an interpretation already arrived at.
91
 The other justifi-
cation for using the sources of interpretation enumerated in Article 32 is corrective: if, and 
only if, the interpretative rules under Article 31 leave the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or 
would lead to a result that is ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’,92 one may consider the 
travaux préparatoires and factual circumstances obtaining at the time of a treaty’s conclusion. 5 
These means ‘can be read as allied to, but contrasted with’,93 the rules in Article 31. 
Whatever this secondary nature, in practice recourse to preparatory work is more wide-
spread than its ‘supplementary nature’ would suggest: even if declining somewhat in recent 
years, ‘most international lawyers will almost automatically include a discussion of preparato-
ry works in legal argument, and will consider it vital to do so’.94  10 
This surely makes logical sense: in seeking to identify the intention of the drafters of a legal 
text, it would seem not only impractical, but counter-intuitive, to postpone all consideration of 
the circumstances behind its conclusion until after subsequent practice and customary interna-
tional law rules have been examined.
95
 Preparatory work, in the widest sense, constitutes part 
of the context behind the final treaty text.
96
 Moreover, international courts and tribunals do 15 
refer expressly to the drafting history of treaty provisions; even if they formally rely upon a 
treaty’s drafting history only after applying the general rule, the impact it might have played 
in a court’s reasoning and decision-making process should not be underestimated.97 The real 
question is therefore the legitimacy of recourse to such methods. Given that the overriding 
intention of interpretation through the VCLT methods is to determine the intention of the par-20 
ties, to dismiss outright recourse to preparatory work, even for the textualist, would be justifi-
able only: 
If one accepts that it is the goal or aim of treaty interpretation to find something beyond the text of the 
treaty and if one argues that that goal can only be validly reached by reference to the text, rather than 
extra-textual references.
98
 25 
Quite simply, recourse to preparatory work, as an extra-textual source of interpretation, un-
derscores the basic purpose of interpretation in discerning the intention of the authors to a 
legal text.
99
 It constitutes recognition that the meaning of norms does not simply lie behind 
words, but is the product of interpretation. Yet looking through a text for the ‘force behind 
it’100 also brings with it certain problems, not least the difficulty in constructing a uniform 30 
                                                 
91
 In Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
note 53 at 63, the Court considered that if a text is ‘sufficiently clear’, ‘consequently it does not feel that it 
should deviate from the consistent practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice, according to which 
there is no occasion to resort to preparatory work if the text of a convention is sufficiently clear in itself’. Cf. 
Hersch Lauterpacht, De l’interprétation des traités, Rapport et projet de résolutions présentés à l’Institut de Droit 
International 43 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International (1950) 366–460 at 433–434, which supported full 
recourse, as a primary means of interpretation, to ‘duly authenticated and published’ travaux préparatoires, 
suggesting their utility in establishing the intention of the parties. 
92
 Art. 32 VCLT. 
93
 Gardiner, note 46 at 37. During the Commission’s deliberations on the matter, Tunkin suggested that they are 
‘secondary sources of interpretation, which had to be taken into account, but did not have the same legal force.’ 
See 871st Meeting of the Commission, note 68 at 190. 
94
 Jan Klabbers, ‘International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of Travaux Préparatoires in Treaty 
Interpretation?’ 50 Netherlands International Law Review (2003) 267–288 at 268. 
95
 Gardiner, note 46 at 10. 
96
 Klabbers, note 94 at 285. 
97
 The immediate example that comes to mind is Case Concerning Application of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, note 97. But it is not isolated: the history of a given 
treaty provision is often reviewed by courts and tribunals as part of the relevant law (i.e. the context), and argua-
bly therefore plays an important role in a court’s reasoning, even if it is usually only formally relied upon after 
applying the general rule. See, for further examples, Gardiner, note 46 at 38–45. 
98
 Kammerhofer, note 65 at 90. 
99
 McNair, note 74 at 411. 
100
 Linderfalk, note 37 at 43. 
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collective intention of its authors,
101
 or in situating how practice contributes to the interpreta-
tion of a text.
102
 
4.4  ‘Objective’, ‘Dynamic’, and ‘Evolutive’ Interpretation 
It is perhaps true that the VCLT’s approach to interpretation strives to outline the means of 
identifying the intention of the parties in arriving at the legal text they have produced. Yet 5 
there are two important notes of cautions to be raised, as one cannot adhere strictly to the be-
lief that interpretation will always yield an objective conclusion as to the parties’ intentions. 
First, parties’ intentions cannot be assumed to be so transparent, for a number of reasons. Par-
ties may, in good faith, have attached different meanings as to the language agreed between 
them.
103
 Parties may be unable to reach agreement on certain details, and thus have deployed 10 
‘ambiguous or non-committal expressions’;104 this might even be in order ‘to leave the diver-
gence of views to be solved in the future by agreement or in some other way’.105 Parties may 
not have envisaged that a given subject-matter would be applied at the time of drafting; or 
drafters may have, whether by carelessness or design, included treaty provisions which con-
tradict each other in application to a given subject-matter.
106
 This is also the case when the 15 
treaty ‘actually registers the absence of any common intention … or contains provisions 
which are mutually inconsistent and which the creative work of interpretation must reduce to 
some coherent meaning’.107 The linguistic basis of law and legal texts thus can and does admit 
of evolution in meaning.
108
 Put differently: 
If the text of a treaty is recognised as the object of interpretation [Auslegung], then nothing stands in 20 
the way of assuming that the text can experience a change of meaning in the course of its development 
even without any tacit modification of the treaty.’109 
Secondly, undue faith in intentionalism also underplays the possibility that the drafters in-
tend to bestow expressly upon the interpreter the power to give meaning to the text, either to 
allow for the divergence to be resolved by agreement or otherwise,
110
 to allow the text to 25 
evolve ‘dynamically’.111 This can be achieved through the use of generic terms whose mean-
ing is susceptible to evolution over time.
112
 That parties may choose to conclude texts of this 
                                                 
101
 Venzke, note 19 at 3.  
102
 Venzke, note 19 at 4. 
103
 Lauterpacht, note 4 at 77–78. 
104
 Lauterpacht, note 4 at 77. 
105
 Lauterpacht, note 4 at 77–78. Stone, note 85 at 347 makes the same point less charitably. 
106
 What is particularly interesting is that resolving the contradiction is in fact ‘imputing rather than discovering a 
common intention underlying the treaty as a whole’: Lauterpacht, note 4 at 81. 
107
 Lauterpacht, note 4 at 52; see also Gardiner, note 46 at 27. Orakhelashvili, note 7 at 339, reduces ambiguity to 
a problem to be clarified, and concludes essentially that ambiguity is ‘only a factor that opens the door for other 
factors of interpretation that are available within the framework of the relevant treaty’. 
108
 Venzke, note 19 at 39-40, cites a number of judicial institutions giving sanction to this principle: the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey), ICJ Reports 1978, 3, para 77, and 
Dispute concerning Navigational Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), ICJ Reports 2009, 213, para 65; the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights, in Bayatyan v Armenia, App. Application no. 23459/03 (27 October 2009), at para 
63, and Scoppola v Italy (no 2), Grand Chamber, App. No 10249/03 (17 September 2009), at para 104; and the 
WTO Appellate Body, in United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp-like Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, 6 November 1998, paras 127-31, and China—Publications and Audiovisual Products, 
WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 December 2009, para 47. 
109
 R Bernhardt, Die Auslegung völkerrechtlicher Verträg. Insbesondere in der neueren Rechtsprechung interna-
tionaler Gerichte (Heymann 1963) 132, translated by Venzke, note 19 at 4. 
110
 Stone, note 85 at 348. 
111
 See Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (London 
Institute of World Affairs 1950) xiv–xv. 
112
 The ICJ used this approach in Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), 
Judgment of 13 July 2009, ICJ Reports (2009) 213 at 242–243 (paras 63–66). 
Gleider I Hernández 14 
sort makes it difficult to arrive at an objective interpretation based on their intentions at the 
time of the conclusion of a treaty, and requires one to give the treaty terms meaning at the 
time that an interpretation of its terms is required.
113
  
Take the example of standard-setting instruments such as human rights conventions. Alt-
hough formally structured like all other multilateral conventions,
114
 these are framed so that 5 
the rights and obligations embodied in them are integral,
115
 as obligations to all other con-
tracting parties, or in other words, as obligations erga omnes partes.
116
 The very structure of 
such agreements, therefore, requires that legal provisions be interpreted with a view to the 
overall object and purpose of the convention, and where appropriate, a teleological, systemat-
ic interpretation which recalls the convention’s place in the legal system as a whole.117 An-10 
other example of such a treaty would be the UN Charter, the quintessential instrument on 
which it seems to be agreed that the teleological method of interpretation has ‘pride of 
place’.118 As Kammerhofer explains, besides the entire structure and framework of the Char-
ter itself, to discern properly its telos it is both advisable and common to look extra-textually, 
both into its travaux préparatoires
119
 but also into the subsequent practice of its principal or-15 
gans and its member states.
120
 It is difficult to understand how preparatory works can hold a 
diminished place in teleological interpretation, as whilst their use to buttress the intentions of 
the parties might be ‘tautologically limited’; they seem eminently suited as a means to discov-
er the object and purpose of the treaty. In short, in such circumstances, parties must be re-
garded as having consented to a dynamic, ‘evolutive’ approach to the interpretation of their 20 
respective obligations.
121
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118
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The concerns expressed above aim to demonstrate that the intention of the parties simply 
cannot always be the prime consideration, even if it is highly relevant. Parties must be regard-
ed as having assented to a treaty being situated within an intellectual framework that under-
pins the international legal order, with its terms being susceptible to interpretation according 
to the canons and processes of that frame. Their very consent, and not merely the legal text 5 
concluded between them, can be ‘objectivised’ rather than merely be seen as objective: the 
process of interpretation is removed from the parties. Had they intended otherwise, they 
would have subjected their treaty to another legal structure altogether. Moreover, although 
parties can reasonably expect disagreement over the meaning of terms, they do not expect 
every disagreement to signify a desire on the part of one or the other to terminate the relation-10 
ship embodied in the treaty.
122
 In short, parties to a treaty consent to obligations with the im-
plicit understanding that there may be disagreements as to the tenor and scope of those obliga-
tions, and they consent to a system of rules to resolve those disagreements. In this respect, 
even if the sources and methods of interpretation are different, and the materials and refer-
ences to be examined may vary somewhat, the teleological mode of interpretation can be dis-15 
tilled into seeking to discern what precisely the parties have agreed to be bound by, an essen-
tially objective exercise. 
As a matter of practice, parties are of course free to formulate rules strictly or expansively; 
and whatever their unilateral wish, as a general rule, it can be said the common intention of 
parties should be distilled so that the rights and obligations created in a treaty obligation can 20 
be equitably interpreted, in a spirit of good faith, common sense, and reasonableness.
123
 Even 
setting aside these platitudes, which provide little guidance to an impartial third party that 
seeks to reconcile the competing interpretations of parties and to identify the commonalities 
between their views, the various means of interpretation deployed in the VCLT demonstrate 
the difficulties of objective interpretation and the continued allure of more subjectivist ap-25 
proaches, to which this chapter now turns. 
5. Subjectivity and Interpretation 
5.1 Beyond Objectivism 
The various theories described above all strive to delineate and describe a process of objective 
interpretation, one whose object is to distil true meaning from legal texts: even if one moves 30 
away from textualist assumptions about interpretation, one cannot supplement the text with 
anything that it does not already contain.
124
 For all the rigour that the VCLT rules purport to 
establish in matters of interpretation, there is a serious theoretical problem with uncritical ac-
ceptance of these rules, which, after all, are based on the positivist aspiration to identify legal 
norms, and on the belief that such identification can be objective to the neutral, expert inter-35 
preter. Yet by its very nature, the process of interpreting a text requires cognition of that text, 
and a judgment as to how its meaning should be understood. As explained above, the interpre-
tative act is a choice between the alternatives made simultaneously available and limited by 
that text. Such a claim defies the claim that meaning lays hidden behind a text, ready to be 
discerned objectively; it is the product of the cognitive process of interpretation. Moreover, 40 
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because interpretation remains an epistemological tool and cannot be reduced to a set of pos-
ited rules, the process of interpretation must necessarily exist prior to the substantive or pro-
cedural rules or norms to be interpreted. In a sense, therefore, the rules of interpretation exist 
outside the realm of rules of law, as they are partially connected to the subjectivity of the in-
terpreter and not to the purported objectivity of a text. 5 
It is claimed that there is an ironic circularity in the VCLT rules in that Articles 31–33 
must, in ‘infinite regression’, be interpreted.125 More generally, Hart suggests that rules of 
interpretation are themselves nothing but rules and subject to the same fate of interpreta-
tion.
126
 This is an over-simplification, confusing the hermeneutic process of interpretation 
with such rules of interpretation as might be posited. As Kammerhofer explains, rules are 10 
‘acts of will purporting to modify the frame of the possible meanings of norms.’127 The her-
meneutic process of interpretation is anterior to such norms, and external to the frame. Yet, 
whatever views exist as to whether interpretation exists outside the frame or is part of the 
frame itself, the quasi-scientific approach to law has its weaknesses: as Koskenniemi notes, 
the one thing that unites Kelsen and McDougal is: 15 
[T]heir insistence on the indeterminate, subjective, political character of interpretation. They … criti-
cize disguising the arbitrariness of interpretation under the fictions of textual clarity or juristic method. 
They propose that interpretation be conducted openly by reference to important values’.128 
As such, to anchor a positivist approach to interpretation too closely to objectivism consti-
tutes an incomplete understanding of the positivist approach to interpretation. The idea that 20 
international law must merely be applied ‘correctly’ to yield a consistent answer each time to 
any given question suggests a certain objectivity in the rules of application that does not seem 
to be borne out in practice. The indeterminacy that is yielded through this undue faith in the 
VCLT rules of interpretation opens the door to Beckett’s criticism that these rules privilege 
desirability through their sheer contradiction: ‘one can add or remove words to realise the 25 
telos imposed … as in the end, Art. 31 mandates “decontextualised and arbitrary reason-
ing”’.129 
5.2 The Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence of the New Haven School 
Accordingly, a few tentative steps outside what is generally understood as ‘positivist’ are nec-
essary, and at this juncture, it is interesting to focus on the essence of the argument favoured 30 
by the founders of the New Haven school of policy-oriented jurisprudence. In The Interpreta-
tion of Agreements and World Public Order, McDougal, Lasswell and Miller sought to eluci-
date a different mode of interpretation, one which set that process within their conceived 
framework of world public order.
130
 Part of a consciously different ‘intellectual strategy for 
restating a subject of basic importance’,131 the New Haven approach flowed from redefining 35 
the very concept of ‘international agreement’: 
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The most comprehensive and realistic conception of an international agreement … is … not that of a 
mere collocation of words or signs on a parchment, but rather that of a continuing process of commu-
nication and collaboration between the parties in the shaping and sharing of demanded values.
132
 
The divergence from the VCLT methods of interpretation is conscious and emphatic, as is 
exemplified by the scathing attack on textualism by McDougal, Lasswell and Miller: 5 
It is the grossest, least defensible exercise of arbitrary formalism to arrogate to one particular set of 
signs – the text of a document – the role of serving as the exclusive index of the parties’ shared expec-
tations.
133
 
Instead, they argue that: 
[T]he primary aim of a process of interpretation by an authorized and controlling decision maker can 10 
be formulated in the following proposition: discover the shared expectations that the parties to the 
relevant communication succeeded in creating in each other.
134
 
The approach favoured is contextual: to situate international agreements and the obligations 
they contain as part of a larger context, thus engaging in a ‘systematic, comprehensive exami-
nation of all the relevant features of that context, with conscious and deliberate appraisal of 15 
their significance’.135 
New Haven was thus the outline of a method, one entirely different from the positivism that 
permeated the VCLT approach, although both ostensibly sharing the primary aim of ascer-
taining the intention of parties to an agreement.
136
 What is particular about the New Haven 
school is that it redefines the intentions of parties into their ‘shared expectations’, which are to 20 
fit into a distinctive view on the nature of the international legal system: 
This primary, distinctive goal [of interpretation] stipulates that decision-makers undertake a disci-
plined, responsible effort to ascertain the genuine shared expectations of the particular parties to an 
agreement. The link with fundamental policy is clear: to defend the dignity of man is to respect his 
choices and not, save for overriding common interest, to impose the choices of others upon him.
137
 25 
The distinguishing feature, aiming to ascertain the ‘shared subjectivities of communica-
tors’,138 is wholly to remove the text as the principal object of the interpretative process. The 
consent-based, intentionalist elements of the VCLT approach remain alive, but the objective 
character of legal texts is subordinated, instead being replaced by an inquiry into the subjec-
tive, common agreement of the parties, which in turn is understood against a common (objec-30 
tive) ‘standard of justice’. The formalism of the VCLT approach, which insisted on the im-
portance of the text as a primary element to be considered in the interpretative process, is lost. 
5.3 Implications of Interpretation According to the New Haven School 
The shortcomings in the purported objectivity of the VCLT approach to interpretation are one 
matter; but it is the totalising pretentions of the New Haven school, of interpreting all legal 35 
texts from a purported common standard of justice, that are genuinely problematic. The prin-
cipal criticism to be levelled against the New Haven school is rooted in the indeterminacy of 
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the international legal system, at the very least with respect to the values it means to embody. 
The New Haven school elides the possibility that there remain a multiplicity of values and 
objectives, all possibly mutually contradictory, embedded in supposedly objective, ‘positivist’ 
law. Instead, the New Haven school portrays the international legal frame as fully determi-
nate, complete through its abiding quest to elucidate and advance ‘the realization of a world 5 
public order of human dignity’,139 which in turn is based on its own conception of what such 
human dignity would entail. As such, it falls prey to the concern that interpreters will, more or 
less unquestioningly, conduct the interpretative process with reference to their individualised 
conception of these values: ‘interpretation may … have recourse to values already embodied 
within the system to determine which interpretation best makes sense systemically’.140 10 
Moreover, although it is true that the New Haven school has never purported to settle ques-
tions of interpretation by endowing a text with a clarity that it does not possess,
141
 its empha-
sis on specific policy objectives in fact embodies an important characteristic shared with the 
objectivist schools of interpretation. Both approaches attempt to define the interpretative pro-
cess by advancing a more or less objective claim as to the nature of the international legal 15 
system as a determinate, complete system. Whilst classical positivist theory situates the 
VCLT rules, arrived at consensually, as part of the ‘inner coding’142 of the international legal 
system, the New Haven school merely situates that focus differently: international agreements 
are to be measured by some overriding, nebulous, ‘common standard of justice’,143 or alterna-
tively, a substantive overarching end of ‘protecting human dignity’.144 Both traditions create 20 
an expectation as to what constitutes a right and proper interpretation within the international 
legal system, and offer, therefore, a form of operational closure:
145
 a set of rules and tech-
niques not only defined by international lawyers for international lawyers, but also a systemic 
understanding that comes to define the international legal system. Interpretation, the epistemic 
exercise through which the system constructs its own realities and applies them to concrete 25 
cases, in this respect remains ‘autopoeisis’ at its best, impacting and affecting the system as 
rapidly as it creates expectations for how the system is meant to function.
146
 In short, interpre-
tation theory remains rooted in a faith that there is ‘truth’ to be found in the legal system, and 
that the system, even if imperfect, is perfectible through technique. It is that quest for truth 
that will be examined in the concluding arguments of this chapter. 30 
5.4 The ‘Search for Truth’ Immanent in Interpretation Theory 
Perhaps it is to be left to the ‘post-modernists’ to salvage the thoughts of the ‘modernists’ in 
search for a fuller understanding of the interpretative process. In an early article,
147
 David 
Kennedy challenged that very search for truth – ‘the idea of an unknowable subject that de-
mands understanding’148 – inherent in interpretation theory. Part of his challenge is based in 35 
the difficulty in actually discerning objective truth: ‘[t]he view that things “really are” or real-
ly could be completely open ended is either nihilism or lunacy. But it is a lunacy that interpre-
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tation seems able to cure.’149 According to Kennedy, ‘truth’ is not to be found in the text, the 
authors, nor the context, a claim that would obliterate the VCLT rules. Nor would truth be 
found in the interpreter. His claim focuses on the ‘hermeneutic moment’ in which the inter-
preter resolves the meaning of a legal text:  
This movement from truth to power is constructed so as to deny both the authority of any theory of 5 
truth and the exercise of any power. The hermeneutic moment is supplemental to the stable standoff of 
the interpretive process. As theorists, we achieve it, in part, by focusing upon what the interpreter must 
have been thinking given his admittedly socially constructed consciousness … we get out of the 
stalemate of conflicting and irresolvable truth claims.
150
 
The unknowable ‘hermeneutic moment’ shifts the focus of discussion, suggesting that the 10 
purpose of hermeneutics within a discipline is not to dictate a method of interpretation for that 
discipline but, rather, to assess empirically the ‘self-understanding’ of the interpreter and to 
scrutinise how the interpretative process works in practice.
151
 David Hoy claims that the em-
phasis on empiricism allows us to suspend the assumption that law is ‘miraculously rational’ 
or merely ad hoc,
152
 and that the emphasis on the hermeneutic moment is the sole outcome 15 
once a totalising moment can be reduced to a privileging of textual oppositions: without that 
hermeneutic moment, ‘we cannot really contemplate an infinity of meanings and still claim to 
be understanding the text’.153 This turn to empiricism, accordingly, also represents an empha-
sis on the manner in which actors entrusted with interpretative authority provide legitimation 
for their practices and methods.
154
 Moreover, it allows the identification of larger struggles for 20 
semantic authority, in which ‘actors craft legal interpretations in an attempt to implement 
meanings of legal expressions that are aligned with their convictions or interests’.155 
Yet, such a turn to empiricism is problematic in that it transforms hermeneutics into meta-
theorising about interpretation practice, a ‘theory of theories’, privileging interpreters’ self-
understanding, to the extent that this is even feasible. As Kennedy underlines, a turn to empir-25 
icism confines hermeneutics to: 
[C]onsumption by the analytic elite; those whose consciousness positions them above the judicial in-
terpreters themselves, but who can escape responsibility for their own ‘understanding and interpreta-
tion’ by flaunting the infinite regress of their methodology and by calling it ‘modesty’ about ‘practi-
cal’ effects.156 30 
Accordingly, it becomes impossible to engage in a critique of reason as the discussion be-
comes centred on sources and actors making claims to interpretative authority. To do so, even 
whilst demonstrating the fragility of privileging one source over another, or the intention of 
the interpreter over that of the author of a legal text, leads nowhere else than to the ‘authority 
fetishism’ rebuked by Kennedy,157 which merely displaces speculation relating to the inten-35 
tions and mindset of the authors of a legal text over to the interpreters of that text. Such em-
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phasis on actors incorrectly situates the focus of analysis, ignoring how successful interpreta-
tions become ‘expressions of power in the sense that they influence what the law means and 
thus shape others in the determination of their own circumstances and fate.’158 
And what if this line of reasoning leads one to the conclusion that there is no such thing as 
the ‘truth’; of a universal morality being impossible? Venzke makes an interesting claim to 5 
agnosticism, a minimal commitment through which a ‘minimal residual element of subjectivi-
ty’ is sufficient to admit of genuine agreement.159 Without this, the analysis becomes exclu-
sively structural, entirely ignoring the practice of relevant actors: it denies the constructive or 
constitutive power of actors, of the normativity or power of the law. The acceptance of inter-
national actors, which is a necessary condition for the development of international law, de-10 
mands an understanding of interpretation as an act of authority, dependent on its ability to 
induce acceptance by way of argument or persuasion, rather than an act of power.
160
 
Ultimately, the true value of hermeneutics in interpretation theory lays elsewhere, in lead-
ing us to consider and to theorise about the structure of interpretation, rather than interpreta-
tion itself. This would allow scholars of interpretation theory to continue to consider, or even 15 
‘recuperate’, the text as part of their own project,161 but without becoming slavishly dogmatic 
as to its centrality to interpretation. 
6. Concluding Observations 
There is something compelling in Martti Koskenniemi’s claim in The Gentle Civilizer of Na-
tions that the international legal profession’s evolution through the early twentieth century 20 
consummated its maturity as a discipline by suppressing its link to describing the practice of 
nations (and thus describing relations of power).
162
 International lawyers claimed authority for 
international law through a turn to what is now classical legal positivism, brought about by a 
claim about the ‘truth’ of the law and legal texts. Yet, the interpretative process remains a set 
of shared vocabularies and techniques which are to be mastered by international lawyers for 25 
international lawyers. The abdication of political responsibility that can result from this blind 
focus on technical prowess and objectivity risks the classical positivist international lawyer 
becoming rather far removed from questions of ideology and power.
163
 In this respect, an ‘oe-
cumenical’164 rejuvenated legal positivism holds appeal; one can draw from the lessons on 
semantic indeterminacy of Kelsen and Hart, as well as both the subjectivist, ideological cri-30 
tiques of interpretation that more critical voices have expressed. For all its flaws, even the 
value-laden approach of the New Haven school may be helpful: it has the virtue of seeking to 
engage with the law (albeit instrumentally), breaking at least partially with the truth-seeking 
of classical legal positivism and transparently acknowledging the interpenetration of law and 
policy.
165
 35 
For better or for worse, one’s views on the interpretative process will necessarily remain 
coloured by one’s views as to what is the object of interpretation: is it a search for objective 
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truth? A reconciliation of ‘shared subjectivities’? An ‘infinite regress’ of methodology? All of 
these highlight the basic tension as to the (possibly radical?)
166
 (in)determinacy of law for 
positivists, and whether rules of interpretation can actually aspire to entrench and enhance the 
effectiveness of international legal rules. In the final analysis, the real question is not whether 
rules of interpretation yield fruit in a quixotic quest for legal certainty; instead, equally rele-5 
vant remain the rich milieu of sources and materials surrounding the legal text itself: methods 
and forms of interpretation (e.g. the limits of grammatical interpretation when faced with the 
inevitable indeterminacy of language), the actors who are involved in the act of interpretation 
and the authority they claim to wield, and the sources of law which fall to be interpreted. And 
as Kennedy reminds us, if the analysis that drives us through this inquiry is complete, this 10 
panoply of sources will – and should – yield conflicting signals.167 Such ambiguity is not 
meant to be a failure of interpretation, but a reflection of ambiguities within the legal system 
itself. As such, in a sense, any study of the rules of interpretation, which indeed is but a sec-
ondary topic in the light of the role of interpretation as a hermeneutic tool, necessarily extends 
further than the rules themselves, and must also study the practice of relevant law-applying 15 
actors as an equally important locus for the construction of meaning. For it is the claim of 
law-applying actors to ‘semantic authority’, or the capacity to influence and shape meanings 
as authoritative reference points in legal discourse’,168 that is equally important. The focus on 
interpretative authority opens a discussion on legal normativity, going beyond obligation and 
very much into the practice of international actors. Any such study might even address the 20 
conceptual disagreement as to the form of international law itself, a much wider project for all 
international lawyers. 
The possibility remains that a fetishisation of the interpretative process gives the interna-
tional lawyer a false sense of safety, reassuring him or her of the objectivity of the rules of 
interpretation. By burying interpretation theory in technical or theoretical rationalisations, the 25 
curious divorce between what interpretation ‘is’ and what interpretation ‘means’ suggests two 
conclusions: by seeking refuge in the form of interpretation, the lawyer can evade responsibil-
ity for the outcome of an interpretative process. Yet more than that, by reducing the study of 
interpretation and interpretation theory to exclude all that one does not wish to consider simp-
ly by dismissing it as being ‘improperly legal’, one loses sight of how interpretation perme-30 
ates all of legal life.
169
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